The Financial Sector Legislative Reforms Commission was constituted by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, in March, 2011. The setting up of the Commission was the result of a felt need that the legal and institutional structures of the financial sector in India need to be reviewed and recast in tune with the contemporary requirements of the sector. The institutional framework governing the financial sector has been built up over a century. There are over 60 Acts and multiple rules and regulations that govern the financial sector. Many of the financial sector laws date back several decades, when the financial landscape was very dierent from that seen today. For example, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Act and the Insurance Act are of 1934 and 1938 vintage respectively. Financial economic governance has been modified in a piecemeal fashion from time to time, without substantial changes to the underlying foundations. Over the years, as the economy and the financial system have grown in size and sophistication, an increasing gap has come about between the requirements of the country and the present legal and regulatory arrangements. Unintended consequences include regulatory gaps, overlaps, inconsistencies and regulatory arbitrage. The fragmented regulatory architecture has led to a loss of scale and scope that could be available from a seamless financial market with all its attendant benefits of minimising the intermediation cost. A number of expert committees have pointed out these discrepancies, and recommended the need for revisiting the financial sector legislations to rectify them. These reports help us understand the economic and financial policy transformation that is required. They have defined the policy framework within which reform of financial law can commence. The remit of the Commission is to comprehensively review and redra the legislations governing India’s financial system, in order to evolve a common set of principles for governance of financial sector regulatory institutions. This is similar to the tradition of Law Commissions in India, which review legislation and propose modifications. The main outcome of the Commission’s work is a draft ‘Indian Financial Code’ which is non-sectoral in nature (referred to as the draft Code throughout), which is in Volume II of the report and replaces the bulk of the existing financial law.
We exploit the randomized allocation of stocks in 54 Indian IPO lotteries to 1.5 million investors between 2007 and 2012 to provide new estimates of the causal effect of investment experiences on future investment behavior. We find that investors experiencing exogenous gains in IPO stocks (the treatment) are more likely to apply for future IPOs, increase trading in their portfolios, exhibit a stronger disposition effect, and tilt their portfolios towards the sector of the treatment IPO. Treatment effects vary with the characteristics of the treatment (size, variability, and salience of the gain), and are stronger for smaller and younger accounts. Treatment effects persist for larger and older accounts, suggesting that experiencing gains exerts a powerful force even on sophisticated players.
This paper investigates the relationship between lifespan expectations and household investments in risky financial assets. Households that experience natural dis- asters and mass shootings in their county and through their social network across the United States are more pessimistic about their life expectancy. These revisions are not justified by Bayes’ rule and are reflective of salient experiences. Lifespan pessimism, instrumented by exogenous experiences, reduces the time-horizon for financial planning and investment in risky assets. These findings suggest that salient personal experiences, and those in the social network, shape lifespan expectations and affect household financial decisions.